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Disaster Governance and Challenges in a Rural Nepali 
Community: Notes from Future Village NGO
More than two years after the 2015 earthquakes 
devastated Nepal, Katunge village in Dhading 
district, Nepal, remained as destroyed as it was 
right after the earthquake. While the villagers 
were rather hopeful about rebuilding their 
houses and lives during the immediate relief 
effort in which we engaged, one month after the 
earthquake, now only a few are confident that 
they will ever rebuild their homes. 
In this article, we describe the reconstruction 
progress, followed by a critique of why the 
reconstruction progress has been so slow. We 
conclude with reflections on reconstruction 
challenges interwoven into the context of 
our NGO experience. During our trips to the 
region, we have observed and experienced the 
difficulties people and organizations are facing 
in the reconstruction process. We interviewed 
government officials and NGOs that have been 
involved in reconstruction, which helped us to 
gain insight into broader perspectives on the 
community or family-level realities that hinder 
rebuilding and community revitalization. We 
conclude that by mobilizing earthquake victims, 
it is possible to rebuild houses and revitalize 
communities. Conversely, little progress can be 
expected in Nepal’s rebuilding as long as poor 
governance and poor coordination between 
major reconstruction actors prevails.
Keywords: Nepal earthquake, post-disaster relief and recovery, 
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Introduction
As we walked through Katunge village in Nepal’s Dhading 
district, nearly 18 months after the Spring 2015 earth-
quakes that devastated Nepal, we saw that the village was 
still as broken and shattered as when we saw it for the 
first time after the earthquake. Everywhere we went, we 
saw piles of bricks, debris and houses that were either 
collapsed or showed cracks and gaping holes. Nearly all 
of the families were still living in semi-temporary shel-
ters, mostly made of wood with tin roofs, and often built 
next to their collapsed houses. We visited several families 
living in shelters, and they described the hardships they 
have been enduring since the earthquake. Many talked 
about how difficult life is in the shelters, with leaking and 
draughty roofs, lack of space, and improper sanitation. It 
was not difficult for us to imagine how hard life is for the 
villagers; during several of our field trips we made to the 
village we experienced ourselves how hot it can be in the 
shelters during the summer, and how cold and wet during 
the monsoon season. In our discussions with the villag-
ers, the way people talked about their future significantly 
changed since our last visit, just a few months ago. While 
the villagers were rather hopeful about rebuilding their 
houses and lives when we met them one month after the 
earthquake, now only a few are confident that they will 
ever rebuild their homes. This is a description of our latest 
trip to Katunge village and several other places in Nepal in 
September 2016.
Having been involved for years with a grassroots Non-
Governmental Organization (NGO) called Future Village, 
we decided to provide emergency relief and establish 
a reconstruction project in our project area, Katunge 
village, in Dhading district.1 While prior to the earthquake 
our NGO mainly focused on providing free education 
and health care to the most disadvantaged families in 
the village, our efforts after the earthquake focused on 
supporting and assisting all affected families. Since the 
earthquake we have made several visits to Nepal to con-
tribute to the project and to study the post-earthquake 
situation. During our trips, we have observed and experi-
enced the difficulties people and organizations are facing 
as they try to rebuild, and have spoken to several govern-
ment officials and NGOs that have been involved in the 
reconstruction. 
In this article, we discuss our perspectives on the reasons 
why the reconstruction progress in Nepal has been slow; 
we focus on how Nepalese government and non-govern-
mental organization actions have slowed the revitalization 
process. We argue that the government’s inefficiency to 
deliver funding and services to affected people, and its 
lack of coordination with NGOs in the aftermath of the 
earthquake, are among the main reasons why the recon-
struction progress has been impeded. This paper has 
been written based on the observations we made during 
our several trips, the discussions we had (as represen-
tatives of reconstruction projects) with government 
officials and representatives of other NGOs, and our 
first-hand experiences as members of an NGO involved 
in reconstruction projects. 
This article consists of three parts. First, we describe the 
reconstruction progress. Second, we critically analyze why 
the progress has been so slow. Third, we provide reflec-
tions on reconstruction challenges using our experience 
working with NGOs.
Aspirations and Realities of Reconstruction
The descriptions of Katunge village provided earlier in this 
paper do not differ much from post-earthquake situations 
in the rest of affected areas in Nepal. In most places the 
reconstruction progress has been slow. By the time the 
earthquake marked its first anniversary, and media atten-
tion surrounding the rebuilding progress peaked, none 
of the more than 800,000 houses damaged or destroyed 
during the earthquake had been rebuilt by the government 
(Rigby 2016). This left approximately three million people 
without permanent shelter (Save the Children 2016). At 
that time, most of these affected families were still living 
in temporary shelter unsuitable for Nepal’s intense mon-
soons and cold winters. In some extreme cases, people 
were even living in tents or had moved back into their 
damaged houses (Basu 2016).
The slow reconstruction pace has been met with substan-
tial criticism both inside and outside Nepal, and many 
organizations, including donors, have urged the Nepali 
government to expedite the reconstruction and the 
distribution of grants (Nikhil 2016). Despite this pressure, 
the reconstruction progress only started to accelerate 
in August 2016, when a campaign was undertaken to 
finally distribute the reconstruction grant installment of 
NRs. 50,000 to the affected families that had signed grant 
agreements. This long-awaited installment was part of a 
series of installments that the Nepalese government had 
promised to grant and distribute to all earthquake-affected 
families that had applied for the grant and had signed the 
necessary grant agreement. This grant agreement requires 
affected families to rebuild an earthquake-resistant home 
in accordance with government formulated standards to 
receive further aid. More assessments were also conducted 
in August to identify families who had been affected by the 
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earthquakes but had not been registered. Because of this 
campaign, the number of households receiving the first 
installment increased from 1,000 in June 2016 to 407,007 
by the end of September 2016 (National Reconstruction 
Authority 2016).
In terms of public facilities, the reconstruction progress 
has been better, but can still be considered moderate. 
During the earthquake, 21,169 classrooms were destroyed 
and 27,452 classrooms were partially damaged. By the end 
of September 2016, 8,856 of these classrooms were rebuilt 
or were being rebuilt by the Nepali government or NGOs; 
however, no clear plan had been implemented for rebuild-
ing the remaining classrooms. Reconstruction of the health 
facilities has also been slow, with construction only start-
ing for 444 of the 1,080 destroyed health facilities by the 
end of September 2016, and currently only 200 facilities 
have been reopened. At the same time, construction has 
only just begun for 49 of the 750 damaged cultural heri-
tage sites, making problems worse for an already suffering 
tourism industry (National Reconstruction Authority 
2016).2 
The lack of progress strongly contrasts with the promises 
made during the conference of donors held in June 2015. 
During this conference, donor countries pledged nearly 4.1 
billion USD for the long-term recovery of Nepal, a level of 
commitment that surprised many, and covers just under 
half of the 9.18 billion USD the Nepali government now 
expects will be needed to rebuild the country. In return, 
the Nepali government promised to establish a national 
reconstruction authority that would centrally organize all 
the reconstruction efforts and ensure they are carried out 
expeditiously and fairly. Indeed, the government was able 
to rapidly map the needs and damage in the immediate 
aftermath of the earthquake and communicate those needs 
to international donors, which was promising. This makes 
it even more disappointing that the reconstruction prog-
ress has been slow, despite the availability of extensive 
resources (Nikhil 2016).
What’s Wrong with Rebuilding Nepal?
The slow progress of post-earthquake reconstruction is 
in part the result of deeper socio-political conflicts in the 
Nepali society. First, political dysfunction has worsened 
in the post-earthquake time, and second, the lack of trust 
between the State and NGOs has led to many potential 
reconstruction projects being turned down or being 
ineffective in responding to local needs. In other words, 
post-disaster governance has played a crucial role in the 
reconstruction performance. 
Political Dysfunction in the Post-Earthquake Context
Since 2006, the year when King Gyanendra’s monarchical 
rule collapsed, the new Republic of Nepal has experienced 
endless confrontations based on sharply diverging political 
and ethnic lines. In July 2008, the Maoist leader, Pushpa 
Kamal Dahal (Prachanda), was selected as the first pres-
ident of the Republic and formed a coalition led by the 
Maoist party. However, later the Maoists left the coalition, 
politically destabilizing Nepal and leading to frequent 
changes in the government due to dismissals and resigna-
tions. Although several deadline extensions for drafting 
the new constitution had been made, the political parties 
could not reach a consensus (Jaiswal 2016). In particular, 
Madheshi-based parties from the lowland Tarai region 
had asked for more representation in the parliament and 
refused to support the proposed constitution.
This conflict about a new constitution continued after the 
earthquake. In September 2015, Kathmandu-based politi-
cal parties reached an accord and finally drafted the new 
constitution, however, they failed to gain support from 
the Madheshi groups from the Tarai region who have long 
been fighting for greater autonomy. This impasse led to 
unexpected four-month-long fuel blockades, and protests 
in Tarai escalated and became increasingly violent. The 
fuel blockade eviscerated Nepal’s energy supply, further 
impacting earthquake victims who could not get essen-
tial necessities, such as medical supplies and fuel. Nepal’s 
economy was also badly hit by the earthquake and later by 
the fuel crisis; tourism took a massive hit because of this 
double crisis. High transportation costs also limited recon-
struction progress as much reconstruction work had to be 
suspended. Facing the increasing social turmoil and politi-
cal uncertainty, many NGOs decided to finish their disaster 
relief work in Nepal earlier by December 2015 and gave up 
the long-term recovery and reconstruction projects. 
Little Gets Done Without a Reconstruction Policy
Effective reconstruction policy must go hand in hand with 
good governance, which has been clearly discussed in the 
literature on disaster governance. Empirical examples 
indicate that effective coordination between the State and 
NGOs helps to overcome the relief and recovery challenges 
to those resource-poor countries (e.g. the earthquake in 
Turkey on August 17, 1999). Civil society’s involvement 
strengthens the community’s resilience to future disasters 
(e.g. the earthquakes in Sichuan on May 12, 2008 and on 
April 20, 2013). Disasters can also transform the society on 
multiple levels. For instance, the 1995 Kobe earthquake 
directly caused the development of civil society organi-
zations in Japan because the public believed that these 
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organizations could react to the disasters more effectively 
than the State. All these empirical cases show that the 
involvement of civil society in post-disaster management 
is positive, however, civic cooperation does not appear in 
a vacuum; it relies on state policy (Jalai 2002). There is no 
doubt that the government plays a key role in post-disaster 
recovery, but the level of state intervention is debatable. 
Two major reconstruction experiences—Hurricane Katrina 
(Chamelee-Wright and Storr 2009) and the Indian Ocean 
Tsunami (Aldrich 2010; 2011)3—show that government 
intervention may not necessarily be good and that some 
policies may adversely affect the recovery process. The 
complicated state-led reconstruction policies often cause 
significant delay and encourage disaster-affected com-
munities to take a wait-and-see attitude. Consequently, 
the community’s revitalization is undermined in this 
post-disaster time (Chamlee-Wright and Rothschild 2007; 
Chamlee-Wright and Storr 2009). Chamlee-Wright and 
Storr (2009) also find that the state’s promises are often 
unrealistic, which can exacerbate pessimistic expectations 
among the affected communities if the rebuilding work is 
slow. They conclude that, in contrast with a state where 
power is centralized, the coordinated relationship between 
key stakeholders, including the state, local NGOs, interna-
tional non-governmental organizations (INGOs), and local 
communities, is the key to better recovery. They argue the 
role of the state is to create mechanisms for disaster-af-
fected communities to self-recover by reinforcing their 
local knowledge and community resources. 
Nepal has faced many governance challenges in the 
post-disaster period. Political dysfunction resulted in a 
serious delay in the establishment of a reconstruction 
authority. During the Donor Conference in June 2015, the 
Nepali government promised to establish the National 
Reconstruction Authority (NRA). This authority was 
supposed to oversee all reconstruction work includ-
ing eligibility assessment, project approval and policy 
implementation. It was also responsible for coordinat-
ing, guiding and supporting the activities of ministries, 
local authorities and partner organizations (HRRP 2017). 
Despite the crucial need for the establishment of the NRA, 
the authority was only established in January 2016 after 
several delays. During these eight months from June to 
January, Nepal was left without an official national recon-
struction policy. The delay in establishing the NRA clearly 
reflected the struggle between divergent political parties. 
Pokharel and Wagle (2016) point out that the politicization 
of the bureaucracy in Nepal was a serious issue and that 
most of the civil servants were affiliated with the ruling 
party. The NRA became another way for the major political 
parties to fight for control, specifically over the recon-
struction fund. As a result, a consensus among different 
parties of who should lead the NRA was hard to reach. 
Even after the NRA was finally created in January 2016, 
its function was criticized by the public (Nikhil 2016). 
It was severely understaffed and most positions were 
‘under recruitment.’ Consequently, the release of new 
building codes and reconstruction policies was severely 
delayed. The decision-making process was criticized for 
its lack of accountability and transparency (Parajuli 2016). 
For example, after the NRA took over all reconstruction 
responsibilities, the Nepali government and its foreign 
partners rejected the previous census conducted by the 
Central Bureau of Statistics in the eleven most affected 
districts due to the worry of ‘misappropriation of funds’ 
by ‘fake’ earthquake victims. Huge money was spent for 
‘advance technologies’ and ‘technical manpower’ (mostly 
engineers) on a reassessment effort. Parajuli criticizes 
that the public was never informed about the trade-off 
involved. Furthermore, according to the Aid and Recovery in 
Post-Earthquake Nepal report (The Asia Foundation 2016a), 
coordination between the NRA, officials in the district and 
village officials is rare. The local NRA offices and dis-
trict offices were often confused about their actual roles 
and duties due to frequent changes in national (central) 
level guidelines. It appeared that central-level guidelines 
weren’t flexible enough to respond to district-level real-
ities, and it was difficult to adjust these guidelines and to 
develop local reconstruction policies (The Asia Foundation 
2016b). This top-down approach, along with the govern-
ment’s inability to function properly, resulted in only a few 
houses being rebuilt the year after the earthquake. 
Apart from the delayed reconstruction policy, this recon-
struction strategy fails to respond to local complexities. 
Equality is the most important reconstruction principle 
for the Nepali government’s post-earthquake response. 
An unjust reconstruction policy could further escalate the 
tense ethnic divisions and anxieties following the earth-
quake, therefore the Nepali government has enforced a 
limit on housing grants, and to avoid duplication of relief 
and reconstruction efforts it has retained all decision-mak-
ing power for reconstruction projects. Influenced by the 
approaches used by the State Government of Gujarat to 
rebuild following the 2001 earthquake in India, and the 
advice from the World Bank, the government of Nepal 
decided an owner-driven approach would be the most 
effective and culturally sensitive way to rebuild private 
houses (National Planning Commission 2015). However, 
what government officials promote as equality, in reality, 
does not mean equality for everyone, especially the 
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poor who have difficulty accessing adequate informa-
tion from local officials. According to the recent report 
Building Inequality by Amnesty International (2017), the 
‘owner-driven’ housing reconstruction program, which 
requires proof of land ownership as a condition for house 
owners to qualify to receive housing grants, did not 
address Nepal’s history of feudal land tenure systems 
and local informal tenure relationships. As a result, the 
most disadvantaged groups, including the landless, were 
excluded from this housing scheme. 
In addition, the Nepali government enforced a housing 
grant policy that capped grants at a certain amount and 
did not allow additional top-up grants for marginalized 
communities. All eligible households in rural areas could 
receive NRs. 300,000 ($3,000 USD) in three installments if 
their rebuilt houses complied with the building require-
ments. A staff member from one Taiwan-based NGO 
explained to us why their organization finally gave up on 
their housing reconstruction project, “It is hard for us to 
work because villagers have to choose to get help from the 
government or us, not both. Two Lakh Rupees [approx. 
US$2,000] is a big amount for the rural poor. Villagers 
don’t want to lose the grant opportunity.” Without more 
intervention from NGOs and the State, the owner-driven 
approach simply means that those with the resources can 
build safe houses, but the poor never can. Consequently, 
most of the rural poor continue to live in uninhabitable 
temporary shelters, and their hopes of rebuilding their 
houses seems to be fading.
Wait-and-See Attitudes among Earthquake-Affected 
Communities
Another critical challenge in the post-earthquake scenario 
is the lack of trust between NGOs and the government of 
Nepal. In our discussions with national and international 
non-governmental aid (NGOs/INGOs) workers, respon-
dents stated that they were confused about the frequent 
changes in the reconstruction policy and admitted that the 
one-door system where all reconstruction projects had get 
approval from NRA weakened their autonomy.
On September 9, 2016, when we were on our way to meet 
officers from an INGO, we suddenly heard the news that 
the newly-appointed Prime Minister, Pushpa Kamal 
Dahal, had proposed to increase the housing grant from 
NRs. 200,000 to NRs. 300,000. Together with a proposed 
low interest rate loan, the new housing package for each 
eligible household would be up to NRs. 800,000. The 
INGO officers were shocked and suspected this may be 
just another ploy to obtain popularity, as it did not seem 
realistic in a poor country like Nepal. One officer asserted 
that “this amount is huge even for people living in an 
urban area like Kathmandu.” He was worried that the 
increase in the housing grant would not help to speed up 
the house rebuilding process: “Some people actually can 
manage to rebuild houses by themselves. However, the 
hope for getting more and more housing grants makes 
everyone take a wait-and-see attitude and solely depend 
on government. This is one of reasons for the severe delay 
in housing reconstruction.” At the end of September 2016, 
the NRA announced that over 80% enrolled beneficiaries 
(361,575 out of 455,710) received the first housing grant 
installment. According to our observations in the Dhading 
district (one of the 11 most earthquake-devastated 
districts), even though most villagers had received the 
housing grant, active rebuilding had not yet commenced. 
Some villagers told us they used the money for food 
purchases and festival celebration. Many villagers also 
mentioned that they did not have sufficient knowledge to 
build earthquake-resilient houses.
Government: “NGO Fund is Also a Government Fund”
The direct involvement of NGOs and INGOs in housing 
reconstruction is very rare. Most NGOs and INGOs in 
Nepal have allocated their funds to public infrastructure, 
masonry and carpentry training programs, and livelihood 
improvement activities. This dilemma was prevalent 
among NGOs, and in fact, in February 2016 the NRA 
requested that NGOs and INGOs not provide financial assis-
tance or building materials directly to villagers because 
such organizations could not comply with building codes. 
Later, the NRA clarified that NGOs/ INGOs were welcome 
to become involved in the house rebuilding sector with the 
understanding that the one-door system meant they must 
obtain approval from the NRA and sign a Memorandum 
of Understanding (MoU) with the government of Nepal 
prior to becoming involved. In addition, NGOs were told 
that their housing projects should cover one defined and 
bounded area (such as a whole village or district). The 
NRA also notified the NGOs that no reconstruction proj-
ects should target a particular community based on caste, 
ethnicity or religion as this may harm national, caste, 
religious and ethnic sensitivities, and undermine the 
government’s sovereignty. According to the Mobilization of 
NGOs for Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Procedure Guideline 
issued in April 2016, there must be no duplication of aid 
efforts, which means earthquake victims cannot receive 
financial assistance from both the government and NGOs. 
One politician explained to us that when the NGO signs 
a MoU, the project becomes a government project, “NGO 
fund is also the government’s fund,” said the official.
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The NRA has encouraged NGOs and INGOs to deposit 
funds for private house reconstruction in the NRA’s 
Reconstruction Fund. During interviews, high-ranking gov-
ernment officials pointed out that the one-door system is 
necessary to avoid poor NGO governance in the post-earth-
quake context. While the number of NGOs and INGOs in 
Nepal has increased dramatically in the past three decades, 
their governance has long been questioned due to their 
lack of transparency in the monitoring and evaluation of 
project expenses and of their general activities (Dhakal 
2007). This explains why the guideline requires at least 80% 
of an organization’s total project budget to be allocated to 
project activities, not staff salaries and traveling expenses, 
which is fair. However, this attempt to avoid corruption 
and mismanagement in NGOs has resulted in many NGOs 
simply giving up on their house rebuilding plans, or allo-
cating funds to other recovery activities. It is estimated 
that less than 2% of the rebuilding of private houses will be 
supported by non-governmental organizations.
The NGOs are very suspicious of the one-door recon-
struction approach in Nepal. Some NGOs are concerned 
that they will not be able to be accountable to their 
donors for donations that are managed by the Nepali 
government. In March 2016, we visited one influential 
NGO that had planned to help poor villagers rebuild their 
houses, but had changed their plans when negotiations 
with the government broke down. One of the reasons 
these negotiations halted was that this NGO was asked 
to rebuild the entire district, but the NGO simply did not 
have the ability to do so. The NGO was concerned about 
handing over donations to the government. The NGO 
officer pointed out that safe shelter for affected villagers 
should be the top priority, but it was difficult to deal with 
the bureaucracy. Finally, the decision was made to allocate 
funding to less controversial reconstruction sectors, such 
as education, health and water facilities. Five months later, 
the officer told us that the MoU with the Nepali govern-
ment was finally signed. According to the MoU, the NGO 
would provide financial support to 8,000 households in 
four districts to rebuild their houses and the government 
had the right to decide the beneficiaries and oversee 
grant disbursement.
Under the equality principle, these 8,000 households would 
receive the same housing grant amount as other earth-
quake-affected households. The NGO was also responsible 
for providing the masonry and carpentry training for 
villagers. The officer admitted the agreement was not 
perfect. First, the NGO lost the authority to decide who 
would be the beneficiaries of their funds and how much 
they would be granted. Second, the NGOs presence was 
limited because the beneficiaries did not know the support 
they received originated from the NGO, not the State. 
The senior officer further explained that to increase the 
level of accountability, the NGO would carry out some 
social communication campaigns to inform villagers 
of their right to appeal if they encountered any unfair-
ness in receiving the housing grant. The NGO had hoped 
that through its training programs, more villagers could 
develop enough knowledge to rebuild their houses. The 
senior officer admitted that although the first housing 
grant installment was released, at least 30% of beneficia-
ries, such as female heads of households, the elderly and 
extremely poor families would not be able to rebuild their 
homes. He commented that in the past NGOs had the inde-
pendence to implement more holistic social development 
projects, but after the earthquake, they lost this power. 
For example, they felt the housing grant was inadequate 
for villagers to rebuild their houses, and thus proposed 
giving an extra grant to cover the costs of transportation; 
however, the government rejected this proposal based on 
the principle of equality for all. 
Lack of Long-term NGO Commitment and Coordination
Based on our year-long observation, we noticed that the 
poor performance of some NGOs (both local and interna-
tional) also led to the slow reconstruction progress. Most 
NGOs are involved in masonry training programs, however 
the quality and effectiveness of these programs is a serious 
concern. Some NGOs offered only three-day masonry 
training programs, and the instructors did not even have 
any knowledge on how to build better and safe houses. We 
discussed this issue with a Japan-funded NGO that carried 
out several housing reconstruction training programs in 
rural areas. The staff members explained that due to the 
lack of funding, they did not have a follow-up action plan 
after the completion of model houses. They were optimis-
tic that the government-housing grant was enough for 
villagers to rebuild houses despite the increasing cost of 
transportation, building materials, and labor in rural areas. 
Rebuilding schools was another top priority in earth-
quake-affected districts where NGOs were actively 
engaged. We witnessed that some NGOs perceived the 
project sites as their ‘territories’ and refused to coordinate 
with other NGOs. For example, after a long discussion 
with locals, and having received approval from the local 
officials, our NGO decided to rebuild a small community 
school in Katunge since education was severely affected 
for months after the disaster. However, after we delivered 
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some basic building materials to the school, we received a 
call from another foreign-funded NGO claiming they were 
the only authorized organization to rebuild all schools in 
the region. The NGO even contacted the schoolteachers 
to request they terminate the rebuild project with us by 
offering them ‘better deals’ (meaning that no financial 
or in-kind contribution from locals would be necessary). 
Consequently, we stopped the project and removed all 
building materials. As a local and volunteer-based NGO, 
we did not have enough human resources to look for a 
new beneficial school. This story illustrates that if better 
coordination existed among NGOs, we could distribute 
resources wisely and widely so that more schools could be 
benefited faster.
The sustainability of the top-down reconstruction 
approach has been a serious concern. In our two-year 
observation, the coordination between the State, the NGOs 
and INGOs, as well as local communities, has been very 
limited. Instead of simply offering financial resources in 
an efficient way, we believe that good governance and 
effective coordination will determine whether Nepal can 
be rebuild. Our NGO experience in post-disaster recon-
struction clearly demonstrates that there is reason hope 
for revitalization as well as immense hopelessness.
Hope and Hopelessness: Future Village Housing 
Reconstruction Experiences
The earthquake caused extensive damage in the rural vil-
lages outside of Kathmandu, and the Future Village project 
area was no exception. All the houses had collapsed, and 
some people were killed. Most local school buildings were 
destroyed, villagers had no shelter and were forced to 
sleep in the fields while it rained. There was a severe food 
and water shortage, and immediate assistance from the 
large humanitarian organizations was not forthcoming. 
The events of the initial days following the earthquake 
were discouraging for everyone in the village.
Despite these drawbacks, the community responded rather 
quickly. In the first two months, by working together the 
villagers managed to build a community center, a tempo-
rary school and over 100 temporary shelters. The initial 
response of our organization after the earthquake was to 
provide emergency relief, which included emergency cash, 
funding for the new community building, rice and grain 
distribution, emergency supplies and materials, such as 
fertilizers, to ensure a normal planting season. These com-
bined efforts ensured that community members were safe 
in such a way that they could have positive attitudes about 
rebuilding their lives. 
Moving Ahead in Uncertain Times
What became clear in the first few weeks after the earth-
quake was that it would be unlikely for large INGOs to offer 
support to Katunge Village. At the same time, we noticed 
that the way in which people were working together vol-
untarily both yielded positive outcomes and was the kind 
of mobilization that was needed to encourage people to 
start working together towards community revitalization. 
Therefore, soon after the earthquake we decided to launch 
a reconstruction project called The Chance Initiative 
Figure 1. Villagers erect steel 
house frames under professional 
supervision.
 (Atelier-3 x Design For People, 
2016)
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that would not only provide the resources necessary for 
rebuilding the village, but would also encourage people to 
mobilize in ways that would simultaneously lead to stron-
ger community cohesion. 
In the months that followed, we established partner-
ships with several organizations and produced a strategy 
to rebuild earthquake-resistant houses in Katunge. In 
short, we designed an earthquake resistant steel frame,4 
which could be distributed among the affected families. 
Architects and engineers from our partner organizations 
would provide free training to the community on how to 
erect the steel frames, the necessary foundation for the 
frames, and how to build the rest of the house according 
to government regulations. Apart from the steel frame, 
the materials to build the walls, roofs and floors could be 
sourced from the surrounding environment and the house 
could be built in accordance with cultural and traditional 
knowledge and customs.
Meanwhile, our organization took on the responsibility 
of mobilizing local people, leading the project and partly 
financing it through our global donor network. Several 
fundraising campaigns had already helped us to raise suf-
ficient donation funds to finance the building of the first 
batch of houses by the end of 2015. We planned to use this 
budget to support affected families as follows: our organi-
zation would finance the steel frames (the most expensive 
part of the house that makes it seismic-resistant) and the 
foundation, while the families would be responsible for the 
cost of the remaining materials and were obliged to vol-
untarily help other families (exchange labor) in setting up 
the frame and building the walls and rooves on their own 
homes. In this way, we could ensure that more families 
could be supported, labor costs would stay at a minimum 
for the families, and that each family could decide freely 
which materials it wanted to use in addition to the steel 
frame.
In August 2015, we first presented our plan to the local 
community. At that time, our plan was met with great 
enthusiasm and support from the villagers. A local recon-
struction committee was also formed to coordinate this 
rebuilding work. 
Implementing Reconstruction
As the community agreed with the implementation of our 
reconstruction project, we decided to ship the first batch 
of steel frames from China (the only country close to Nepal 
where such frames are currently made) to Katunge in 
December 2015. During this period, we first encountered 
the political dysfunction in the post-earthquake period: as 
there was no policy established for reconstruction projects, 
the authorities were not willing to allow our frames to enter 
Nepal at the border. In the days that followed, it was difficult 
to talk to the authorities, and the responses they gave us 
were contradictory. In the end, we finally gained approval to 
transport the frames into Nepal, however, we were fined a 
heavy tax as the customs office was only willing to approve 
Figure 2. Rebuilt earthquake-
resistant two-story local house.
 (Lam, 2016)
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it as ‘commercial goods.’ The frames eventually arrived in 
the village in early January 2016.
It was also during this period that we visited the village 
again and started to notice that the opinion of some villag-
ers about our reconstruction project had changed. Rumors 
had started to spread that the Nepali government was 
planning to distribute funds to earthquake-affected families 
soon. As the villagers had heard about the difficulties we 
were experiencing with transporting the steel frame, some 
villagers expressed that they preferred to wait for the gov-
ernment grant instead of starting to rebuild their houses. 
Some others—especially those who were more skeptical of 
the government’s promise—preferred to work with us to 
reconstruct their homes.
In the months that followed, we trained villagers how to 
rebuild their houses using the steel frame, and the first few 
houses were being built. Some of the families did exchange 
labor, while others with more means decided to hire skilled 
workers. At this stage, some villagers were unwilling to 
participate in the exchange of capital or help voluntarily 
because they became unsure whether they themselves 
wanted a steel frame, and thus were skeptical whether they 
would get free labor in return if they waited. 
Later, we had consultations with the local community to 
discuss the need for another batch of steel frames to the 
village. It was around this time that the government had 
also announced the amount of money the earthquake-af-
fected families would be entitled to and the criteria for 
receiving such support. Villagers split into two groups: 
some preferred to rebuild their houses faster and requested 
we order more steel frames, but most chose to wait for the 
government’s support. We also noticed that most of the 
villagers did not understand the conditions for receiving 
such government support. They were under the impres-
sion that the government would give them a sum of money 
upfront as the first installment and were unfamiliar with the 
condition that they had to rebuild their house in accordance 
with the building codes to receive the next installment of 
support. Nevertheless, 20 families eventually decided to 
accept the support from our organization; the community 
selected those families to receive steel frames in April 2016. 
Our organization also approached different government 
officials, and despite their promise to support us, nothing 
was achieved. 
Finally, in April 2016, the Nepali government established a 
policy that made it clear that families who had received or 
would receive support from NGOs to rebuild their houses 
would be ineligible to receive the government’s support. 
The new policy resulted in more and more people taking a 
wait-and-see attitude: they would not rebuild anything until 
the government distributed money. As a result of this policy 
most families spent another monsoon season in temporary 
shelters. 
Around April 2016, it also became clear that NGO’s were no 
longer allowed to operate without obtaining an approval 
for their reconstruction projects from the NRA. Therefore, 
we decided to obtain the government’s approval before we 
shipped a third batch of steel frames. In the months that 
followed, we used our resources to approach district officials 
to tell them about our initiative to help villagers rebuild 
their homes, and to request government approval. However, 
district officials did not show any interest in supporting our 
house rebuilding project. In one meeting, a high-ranking 
official pointed out that the Nepali government was not 
interested in ‘candy-type’ small-scale rebuilding projects as 
he described. He also mentioned that the district govern-
ment did not have any power to make decisions. He directed 
us to contact the NRA, stating: “If you get the NRA approval, 
then we can look at your project.” He also emphasized 
that without such approval, helping villagers to rebuild 
houses would be “illegal.” When asked how to make the 
project legal, he failed to provide useful guidance. During 
the meeting, he did not even look at our proposal. Later, we 
were told that any reconstruction project must first get the 
district government’s support before contacting the NRA. 
Despite continued efforts to obtain government support, 
we have neither heard anything back from local govern-
ment officials nor from the NRA. This has made it difficult 
for our organization to make long-term plans. Indeed, their 
bureaucratic-bureaucracy, which included inconsistent 
information, as well as unclear systems, procedures, delays, 
and negative responses from reconstruction authorities, 
discouraged many NGOs like ours from continuing to con-
tribute to the post-earthquake revitalization effort. 
Two years have now passed since the earthquake hit Nepal 
and since we first started to contribute to its revitalization, 
we have helped to build 27 earthquake resistant houses, one 
temporary school, one community center, one multi-pur-
pose education center and seven earthquake resistant 
classrooms. We still have funding left to build a few more 
houses, but it is difficult to plan what further steps we can 
take due to the lack of government support, complicated 
bureaucratic processes and changing attitudes among the 
villagers who are largely affected by the shifting sands of 
the State’s policy. As a result, we also cannot do additional 
fundraising because of our precarious position.
Most families who received the steel frames have now 
completed their houses. In the meantime, many other 
families have received the first installment of the govern-
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ment’s support. But, after the first screening round, most 
families failed to comply with building codes, and hence 
are unsure whether they will ever receive the second 
installment or be able to complete the reconstruction. 
During our last visit to Katunge in April 2017, we noticed 
that opinions about how to continue rebuilding the village 
have become more diverse. Some families are still confi-
dent that they will receive further governmental support, 
while others have become increasingly skeptical of this 
approach. Some families have decided to start building 
new houses that are not earthquake resistant, and because 
they decided it better than the shelter that they had been 
living in for over two years. Others continue to take a wait-
and-see attitude and cannot foresee building a new house 
anytime soon. For those families, another monsoon season 
in a temporary shelter lies ahead. 
Conclusion
In this case study, we have documented the post-earth-
quake reality of a rural project area involving a grassroots 
NGO. We have highlighted some of the challenges of 
this project, and have interwoven several recommenda-
tions into our discussion for future policy-makers. Our 
reconstruction experience clearly demonstrates that the 
dominance of government control, bureaucracy, lack of 
long-term commitment among NGOs as well as the villag-
ers’ wait-and-see attitudes all undermine the capacity of 
the community’s ability to rebound. In a resource-poor 
village like Katunge, civic participation from villagers, 
NGOs and private sectors are the key for post-disaster 
recovery. We suggest that the Nepali government should 
have a more encouraging framework to govern NGOs and 
an attitude to let the NGOs do what they need to do, so that 
they can mobilize others to help the local residents rebuild 
their communities.
The more time passes without things being done, the 
fewer opportunities Nepali people will have to rebuild 
their homes safely. It has been argued that the people are 
always happy and satisfied with whatever they have or 
can get, and it does not matter whether they are living 
in temporary shelters. However, natural disasters always 
go beyond what we can predict, especially if no action is 
taken. Then the poor are subjected to suffer more. While 
earthquakes are natural phenomena, their effects are not. 
Houses collapse because they are not seismic-resistant. We 
need to build them so that they will survive well into the 
future. We talk about equality in rebuilding, but not about 
justice for the most vulnerable. These man-made aspects 
of the disaster that hinder revitalization of communities 
after natural calamities can only be resolved when all 
social institutions work together cohesively to create a 
better human society. By mobilizing earthquake victims, 
it is possible to rebuild houses and revitalize communities; 
conversely, little progress to rebuild Nepal can be made so 
long as both poor governance, and poor or no coordination 
between major reconstruction actors, prevail.
Postscript
After two years, the reconstruction process remains 
onerous. Out of the 750 affected national heritage sites, 
the NRA has completed the reconstruction of 20, while 
132 are still under construction. In the private housing 
sector, 554,996 households (86% of eligible households) 
have received their first reconstruction installment, 14,466 
households have been verified for their second install-
ment, and 595 households for their third installment. As 
of April 21, 2017, only 22,234 houses have been completed, 
which accounts for only 3.5% of the total rebuild target 
(National Reconstruction Authority 2017). To tackle the 
extremely low housing rebuild rate, the NRA has deployed 
more than 2,000 engineers and assistant sub-engineers to 
the villages to provide technical assistance and conduct 
inspections. On May 15, 2017, the NRA issued its first 
ever appeal urging I/NGOs, the private sector, and phil-
anthropic organizations to expand support for these 
vulnerable communities by providing top up grants of NRs. 
50,000 and/or technical assistance. All these are positive 
signs that the authority recognizes the social dynamics 
of earthquake victims and their communities, and that it 
also notices the need for more flexibility in reconstruction 
policies.
In addition, local elections were held in 34 districts on May 
14, 2017 for the first time since Nepal’s new constitution 
was promulgated in September 2015. The local level has 
been without people’s representatives since 2002. We hope 
these 34,203 directly-elected representatives will give 
local communities a louder voice in national decisions. 
Particularly, in the earthquake affected districts, elected 
local representatives can have the independent authority 
to mobilize local resources to make the decision faster. 
They can also monitor reconstruction efforts against the 
misuse of funds. We hope these elected representatives 
can play a more active role in building stronger connec-
tions between the central government, citizens and donor 
agencies. Good governance is the key to rebuilding and 
revitalizing Nepal. 
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Endnotes
1. On March 10, 2017, the Nepali government has adopted 
a 744 local body system, fulfilling the requirement of the 
new constitution of Nepal that was established in 2015. 
All old municipalities and villages (of which there were 
more than 3,900) were restructured to total only 744 new 
Municipalities and Villages. Katunge village, together with 
Marpak and Semjong, have been merged into ‘Netrawati 
Gaunpalika (Netrawati Rural Municipality)’ (The Himalayan 
Times 2017). Although the old Katunge village doesn’t exist 
any longer, we still refer to it as ‘Katunge’ throughout the 
paper as this is what we and the villagers are familiar with.  
2. Since the earthquake, the tourism industry has also 
fallen very low due to the damage to famous world 
heritage tourist sites and the fear of an earthquake. Nepal 
received 251,148 fewer tourists in 2015, representing a 
sharp drop of 31.78 percent, compared to the 2014 figure 
(Nepal Economic Forum 2016; Prasain 2016; Thapa 2016). 
The fall of tourism arrival has not only affected the hotel 
business but it also severely damaged the business of 
vendors who ran small and local business in the famous 
visiting sites.
3. Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast on August 29, 
2005. Over 80% of the city of New Orleans was flooded and 
estimated property damage was over 125 billion USD. The 
death toll was 1,836, and 15 million people were evacuated 
from their homes. The Indian Ocean Tsunami happened on 
December 26, 2004, and it killed over 230,000 people in 14 
countries. 
4. Our anti-seismic house design is a lightweight steel 
structure with a solid stone foundation. The steel frame is 
designed with diagonal bracing and double beam systems, 
which connect each column with horizontal beams in 
both directions to reduce the column slenderness ratio, 
thereby resisting the horizontal seismic loads. The main 
steel frame components are pre-fabricated in China and 
transported to the village for installation. This lightweight 
steel frame structure could simple be established by bolts 
and nuts that enable the villages to erect the frame easily. 
Alternatively, sometimes due to the family’s economic 
situation, their small family size, or the location of their 
land, the steel frame structure is not suitable. In such 
cases, a traditional home can be built using stone, clay 
and cement using simple architectural techniques to 
make it safer in the event of an earthquake. Our initiative 
presented these alternative structure designs to the local 
community.
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